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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GAG ME WITH A PRIOR
RESTRAINT: A CHILLING EFFECT THAT
SENDS SHIVERS DOWN THE SPINES
OF ATTORNEYS AND
THE MEDIA
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectant, the electric light the
most efficient policeman."'
This statement aptly describes the press and its role in the legal sys-
tem. The media, as part of its duty to inform the public, reports and
comments on judicial proceedings. But the media does more than this; as
an "electric light," it guards against the miscarriage of justice by subject-
ing the legal system to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.2
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
• . .abridging the freedom of speech.... ." The media's right to report
on the judiciary exists at the core of First Amendment values. If the
media lacked access to the courts, secret judicial actions would increase
the public's ignorance and distrust of the legal system.4 With uninhibited
reporting, criticism, and debate, public knowledge and comprehension of
the justice system will increase. In addition, by subjecting the system to
the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability, the quality of
the judiciary will improve.5
The Sixth Amendment provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .... "6 The First and Sixth Amendments may conflict with each
other when the media asserts its right to report and comment, because
the publicity about a criminal defendant has the potential to prejudice a
jury.7
In Radio and Television News Association v. United States District
1. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (quoting L. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933)).
2. Id. at 587.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irwin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). See also Note, Gag Orders: Enhancing Fair Trials or Impeding a
Free Press?, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 933 (1984); Note, John Z DeLorean v. the Media: The Right to a
Fair Trial Without a Prior Restraint upon the Media, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 81 (1985);
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Court8 ("Radio and TV"), the Ninth Circuit dealt with this conflict. In
this case, the Ninth Circuit upheld an order restraining trial counsel for a
criminal defendant from making extrajudicial statements to the news me-
dia.9 The court concluded that the media's interest in interviewing trial
participants was outside the scope of protection of the First
Amendment.10
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The dispute in Radio and TV stems from the espionage trial of Rich-
ard Miller, a former FBI agent. Miller allegedly passed classified govern-
ment documents to two Soviet emigr6s, Svetlana and Nikolay
Ogorodnikov, who also faced espionage charges. The judicial proceed-
ings against Miller received extensive press coverage. In order to assure
a fair trial, the district court warned trial counsel against engaging in
pretrial publicity. " However, shortly before the Ogorodnikovs' trial, the
Los Angeles Times published an article which quoted several statements
made by Miller's defense attorneys.
12
Note, Finding the Path Between an Attorney's First Amendment Right to Free Speech and a
Client's Sixth Amendment Right to a Fair Trial, 22 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 187 (1985).
8. 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2276 (1986).
9. Id. at 1444.
10. Id. at 1447.
11. Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 591-92 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 775
F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2276 (1986) ("Levine IF').
12. Overend, Lawyers Contend FBI Exaggerated Evidence in Spy Case, Los Angeles
Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 1, at 3, col. 1. The following are exerpts from the article:
Defense lawyers in the Richard W. Miller spy case have accused the FBI of
initially exaggerating the evidence against Miller and two Russian emigr6s charged
with conspiring to pass secret government documents to the Soviet Union....
They said in interviews last week that the three accused spies should never have
been prosecuted for espionage because the government has been unable to establish
that Miller actually passed any documents ... or caused any harm to the security
interests of the United States....
"I don't think the case should ever have been brought. The initial characteriza-
tion by the government that this was a major espionage case with untold damage was
an incorrect assessment."
"They acted hastily in filing the espionage charges.... To a large extent, the
FBI misled the U.S. Attorney's office about the stength of the case until it was too
late .. "
"Those two people were indicted with the hope that the charges would be sub-
stantiated, and they haven't been able to do it .... The only reason Miller is still
charged with passing documents is that he admitted it after five days of questioning,
and he'd already told them he'd say anything just to end the questioning."
"If he admitted passing pumpkin papers from the Alger Hiss case, I think he'd
be charged with it .. "
"We've got two dummies here, no question about that .... [b]ut these people
should have never been taken seriously as spies. It's unrealistic to talk about the
Miller case in the same breath as other espionage cases that have come along in the
last few years ...."
1987] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In response to the article in the Times, the United States Attorney
filed a motion for a restraining order regarding extrajudicial statements,
which the district court granted. 3 The order prohibited attorneys in-
volved in the Miller case from "making any public statements about any
aspect of this case that bears upon the merits to be resolved by the
jury."' 4 The court based its decision on the "existence of a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice." 5
Miller and his attorney, Joel Levine, petitioned to the Ninth Circuit
to dissolve the restraining order. The court granted the petition and
found the order overbroad. 6 It directed the district court to define the
scope of the restraining order to include only statements which would
"pose a serious threat to the administration of justice."' 7 The district
court then amended the order which prohibited trial counsel from mak-
ing extrajudicial statements relating to certain subjects.'"
Id.
13. Levine, 764 F.2d at 593.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 597. The district court in oral findings stated:
[I]n view of the comments contained in the Los Angeles Times article, it is plain
that the serious and imminent threat to a fair trial outweighs any First Amendment
rights at stake. To claim that the need to argue a client's case in detail in the press on
the eve of trial is mandated by an ethical or legal responsiblity belittles the govern-
ment's, the defendants', and most importantly in this instance, the public's right to a
fair trial before an unbiased jury ....
Neither the press nor the public has the right to hear counsel argue their case
prior to this court and the impaneled jury hearing the evidence, when doing so seri-
ously impedes the fair and effective administration of justice . . . . However, the
extent of such publicity in its prejudicial potential is of necessity speculative ....
Nonetheless, based upon the details contained within the.., article, which this court
is in no position to assess the veracity of and the motivations behind the article, this
court finds it quite reasonable to expect that such publicity has been and will become
even more pervasive, creating in effect a lobbying effort by counsel on behalf of their
clients. The public has a right to expect a fairer trial than that.
Id.
16. Id. at 599.
17. Id. The appellate court noted that it would be appropriate to proscribe statements
related to the following six subjects:
(1) The character, credibility, or reputation of a party;
(2) The identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a party of a witness;
(3) The contents of any pretrial confession, admission, or statement given by de-
fendant of that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
(4) The identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented or the ab-
sence of such physical evidence;
(5) The strengths or weaknesses of the case of either party; and
(6) Any other information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to
be inadmissible as evidence and would create a substantial risk of prejudice if
disclosed.
Id.
18. Id. The district court adopted the six categories suggested by the Ninth Circuit. See
supra note 17.
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While Miller and Levine seemed satisfied with this new order, the
Radio and Television News Association19 appealed to vacate the
amended order.2" The Association argued that the order denied media
access to the trial participants, constituting a prior restraint on the me-
dia's ability to gather news.2 The Ninth Circuit held that such restraints
did not infringe the freedom of the press, as guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 22
II. TRIAL PARTICIPANTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Levine Court
1. Majority Opinion
The Levine court viewed the district court's order as a prior re-
straint.23 Prior restraints receive strict scrutiny from the judiciary, be-
cause of the peculiar dangers involved.24 One danger arises from the
difficulty in knowing what a person will say in advance. "Without such
knowledge, to forbid such individuals from engaging in speech is to run
the risk that protected speech along with unprotected will either be chil-
led, or possibly punished."25 Thus, the United States Supreme Court on
numerous occasions has stated that any "system of prior restraint bears a
heavy presumption against its validity."
'26
But the Ninth Circuit found scrutiny, in light of the media's First
Amendment rights, unnecessary. The gag order did not deny the media
access to the proceedings or bar the press from releasing information, so
the court concluded that Levine lacked standing to assert the constitu-
tional rights of non-party media organizations.27
19. The Radio and Television News Association is an umbrella organization representing




23. Levine, 764 F.2d at 594. The concept of prior restraint deals with official restrictions
imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publications. See T.
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 648 (1955); M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984).
24. Levine, 764 F.2d at 595. See M. NiMMER, supra note 23 at § 4.04; L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-32 (1978).
25. M. NIMMER, supra note 23 at § 4.04.
26. See Nebraska Press Assn, 427 U.S. at 556-59; New York Times v. United States (Pen-
tagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1968). See also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
27. Levine, 764 F.2d at 594. The court distinguished Levine from Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1984), and Associated Press v.
United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983), where restraining orders prohibited
the media from attending criminal proceedings or reporting on them. Levine, 764 F.2d at 594.
[Vol. 7
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However, the Ninth Circuit then analyzed the district court's order
in terms of the attorney's own First Amendment right to free speech. It
examined the validity of the order by measuring it against a judicially
created three-part test.2" To uphold the order, the government must
establish2 9 that (1) the activity restrained poses either a clear and present
danger or serious and imminent threat to a protected competing inter-
est,30 (2) the order is narrowly drawn,3' and (3) less restrictive alterna-
tives are not available. 32 As to the first prong, it found that intense
prejudicial publicity during and prior to the trial could sway even the
most impartial jury, and that the level of publicity would increase as the
trial approached. 3
However, the Ninth Circuit found that the restraining order failed
to meet the second prong; the order was not narrowly drawn. 34  The
court stated that "many statements that bear upon the merits to be re-
solved by the jury present no danger to the adminstration of justice.,
3 5
The court then ordered the district judge to devise an order specifying
See generally Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411,
427-28 (1977) (noting the "fundamental difference" between a restraining order against the
press and one against the trial participants).
28. Levine, 764 F.2d at 594. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
29. The government had the burden of proof to show no violation of the First Amend-
ment, rather than the party challenging the order. This differs from most situations, because
of the presumption against prior restraints. Levine, 764 F.2d at 595.
30. Id. See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ninth Circuit
stated that the government must show that a post trial order restraining everyone, including
news media, to stay away from jurors, protected the jurors from a clear and present danger or
a serious and imminent threat. The court concluded that no clear and present danger to the
jurors existed, with respect to protecting them from harassment); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
175, 183-85 (1962) (The Court concluded that a trial court's punishment of a sheriff for mak-
ing an out of court statement to the local press abridged his right of free speech. The Court
stated that out of court publications were governed by a clear and present danger standard,
and found that the sheriff's statements did not pose such a threat to the administration of
justice).
31. Levine, 764 F.2d at 595. See Carroll v. President and Comm'rs. of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968) (an order restraining members of political parties from holding rallies
for ten months must be narrowly tailored to the needs of the case; the Court also noted that it
would require the participation of both sides of the case to effectuate this goal).
32. Levine, 764 F.2d at 595. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 563 (the Court listed
the alternatives to imposing a prior restraint: change of venue, postponement, jury voir dire,
sequestration of jurors). Subsequent cases have followed the Nebraska Press Ass'n test: Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys, 729 F.2d 1174; Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358; Central South Carolina
Chapter of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F. Supp 1182 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
33. Levine, 764 F.2d at 598.
34. Id. at 599.
35. Id. (quoting In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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the proscribed types of statements."36
The Ninth Circuit also examined the order in view of the third fac-
tor. It agreed with the district court that no less restrictive alternatives
existed, since voir dire," change of venue,38 postponement,39 or seques-
tration,4 would be ineffective or counterproductive.41
2. Concurring Opinion
Judge Sneed wrote a concurring opinion to express a slightly differ-
ent view about gag orders. He stated that an attorney's respect for the
profession and the integrity of the judicial process should eliminate any
need for gag orders.42 Judge Sneed then suggested that the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee society a fair trial for the accused-
instead the public merely expects a fair trial. Thus, a balance must be
struck between the press' First Amendment rights, the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights, and the public's expectation that the trial will be fair
and before an impartial jury.43 He concluded the courts must undertake
this balancing reluctantly; only when attorneys use the press to obtain a
partial jury, should the courts respond to such action.'
3. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Nelson dissented from the application and result of the three-
part test in Levine. She wrote that the trial record did not demonstrate a
"clear and present danger or serious and imminent threat to the em-
paneling of an impartial jury."45 She further stated that the district court
should focus more on the impact of pretrial publicity on potential jurors
before issuing a gag order. Judge Nelson relied on Columbia Broadcast-
ing Systems v. United States District Court46 as authority for this conten-
tion. The court in Columbia Broadcasting Systems stated:
36. See supra note 17.
37. Levine, 764 F.2d at 600. The court concluded that voir dire would not decrease the
prejudice surrounding the trial, and eliminate the damage already done to the Miller trial. Id.
38. Id. The court concluded that a change of venue would only work if trial publicity was
focused on a specific geographic location. Id.
39. Id. A postponement would only be appropriate if the publicity was temporary. The
media would continue to cover the Miller case, despite any attempts to postpone-the unusual
facts would continue to attract media coverage and sensationalism. Id.
40. Id. Sequestration would have negative effects on the jurors, a result well-documented.
Id. See also J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 181-82. (1977).
41. Levine, 764 F.2d at 600-01.
42. Id. at 601.
43. Id. at 603.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 729 F.2d 1174.
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Only if it is 'clear... that further publicity, unchecked, would
so distort the views of potential jurors that 12 c[an]not be found
who would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty
to render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in
open court' can an appellate court even consider upholding a
prior restraint.47
Based on this, the Levine dissent found the possibility of prejudice in
the Miller trial remote. Judge Nelson suggested that with a population
of twelve million in the Central District of California, selecting an unbi-
ased panel of jurors could occur.4" She then concluded that a gag order
may be permissible in certain cases. But she also emphasized that a court
should seriously consider whether the benefits to the Sixth Amendment
would outweigh the costs to the First Amendment before resorting to a
restraining order on speech.49
B. History and Analysis of Restraining Orders on Trial Participants
Despite the United States Supreme Court's "heavy presumption"5
against prior restraints, a majority of courts have upheld restraining or-
ders prohibiting trial participants from discussing their cases. 5' In up-
holding prior restraints, courts have provided that the accused receive a
trial with an impartial jury, free of outside influences. 52 Given the far
reaching effects of modern communication, and the difficulty of erasing
prejudicial publicity from the jurors' minds, courts must take strong ac-
tion to assure a fair trial.53 The United States Supreme Court used this
rationale in Sheppard v. Maxwell.54 In this case, Sam Sheppard was ac-
cused and convicted of murdering his wife. Judge Bell's opinion for the
state supreme court best describes the trial court atmosphere:
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were com-
47. Id. at 1178.
48. Levine, 764 F.2d at 603. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562 n.7 (The Court
suggested that a pool of 80,000 prospective jurors might be sufficient).
49. Levine, 764 F.2d at 604.
50. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. Levine, 764 F.2d at 596. See, e.g., In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cerL denied,
469 U.S. 837 (1984); In re San Juan Star, 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Tijer-
ina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Central South Carolina Chap-
ter of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1977); KPNX Broadcasting
v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984); Houston Chronicle Publishing v.
Hardy, 678 S.W. 2d 495 (Tex. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); State ex rel. Angel v.
Woodahl, 171 Mont. 13, 555 P.2d 501 (1976).
52. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1962).
53. Id.
54. 384 U.S. 333 (1962).
1987]
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bined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate
the public fancy.... Throughout the preindictment investiga-
tion, the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-week trial,
circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of
the American public.... In this atmosphere of a 'Roman Holi-
day,' Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life."
The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether or not defendant
Sheppard received a fair trial, since the trial judge had failed to protect
Sheppard from the prejudicial publicity surrounding his case.56 The
Court concluded that "where there is a reasonable likelihood that preju-
dicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial," the trial court should
continue the case, transfer it, or see that neither "the accused, witnesses,
court staff, nor enforcement officers coming under jurisdiction of the
Court should be permitted to frustrate its function."5 " The Supreme
Court further stated that the carnival atmosphere of the trial could have
been avoided since the courtroom and courtroom premises are subject to
the control of the court.5"
Another case, United States v. Tijerina, 59 also followed this line of
reasoning. The court stated that the judiciary must take steps to protect
judicial proceedings from outside influences.' No one, including trial
participants, can frustrate this function.6' The court further noted that
orders against extrajudicial statements preserve the integrity of the trial,
"the most fundamental of all freedoms."
62
Courts have invalidated restraining orders against trial participants
in only two instances. In Chase v. Robson,63 the appellate court held the
restraining order constitutionally impermissible. 6' In this case, Freder-
ick Chase and others were charged with depredation of selective service
files. 65 The district court judge issued a restraining order based on de-
fendants' contact with the press, and defense counsel's association with
an attorney who had a reputation for "trying his cases in the press."
66
The Seventh Circuit found this basis had "insufficient support for the
55. Id. at 362.
56. Id. at 335.
57. Id. at 363.
58. Id. at 358.
59. 412 F.2d at 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
60. Id. at 667 (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363).
61. Tijerina, 412 F.2d at 667.
62. Id.
63. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
64. Id. at 1061-62.
65. Id. at 1060.
66. Id. at 1061.
[Vol. 7
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proposition that the defendant's future First Amendment utterance...
would interfere with the fair administration of trial."67 The appellate
court noted that defendant's press releases were seven months old when
the district court issued the order.6" The court further declared the de-
fense counsel's association with other attorneys irrelevant.69 Using the
standard from Nebraska Press Association, the court concluded that a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice did not exist
in the Chase case.7"
The second instance where a court invalidated a restraining order
occurred in In Re Halkin.7 1 Plaintiffs alleged government agencies con-
ducted unlawful surveillance of them because plaintiffs opposed the Viet-
nam War.72 The district court issued an order which prohibited the
disclosure of information obtained through plaintiffs' discovery.73 The
information consisted of government documents which the plaintiffs
wanted to release to the public. The defendant argued that public disclo-
sure would be "prejudicial to the defendants' right to adjudication of the
issues in this civil action in an uncolored and unbiased climate," and the
district court agreed.74 The appellate court reversed the order, stating
that the district court had made no finding that disclosure would pre-
clude a fair trial, and had failed to assess the potential harm posed by
dissemination.75
III. MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Radio and Television News Association Court
1. Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit in Radio and TV reviewed the amended order
which resulted from the Levine decision. The amended gag order re-
flected the Ninth Circuit's previous recommendations, which prohibited
counsel in the Miller trial from making extrajudicial statements relating
to several subjects.76





71. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id. at 181.
75. Id. at 196.
76. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1444. See supra note 17 and accompany-
ing text.
1987]
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media had the right of access or right to gather information with respect
to criminal trials.77 However, this right has been limited to the ability of
newspeople to attend the trials and report on their observations.78 The
media's right to information about a trial is founded on, and not superior
to, the public's right to information.79 Moreover, neither the First
Amendment nor Supreme Court decisions guarantee the media a right to
interview counsel in a criminal trial.8 0 Therefore, the appellate court
held that the media's desire to access certain sources of information was
not sufficient to invoke the First Amendment's right of freedom of the
press." As a result, the court did not see the need to scrutinize the
amended order against the three factors from Levine. 2 The court stated
that it had to determine only whether or not the restrictions imposed
were reasonable, and served a legitimate purpose.83 On the basis of the
district court record, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the restrictions
were reasonable, because a potential impairment to the fairness of the
trial could occur. Ensuring a fair trial is certainly a legitimate purpose.
2. Dissent
Again dissenting, Judge Nelson agreed that the Radio and Televi-
sion News Association had failed to allege a First Amendment violation.
But she noted that the gag order should not have been granted in the first
place due to its impingement on trial participants' rights.84 Judge Nelson
also questioned whether the district court's "wholesale adoption of the
six categories"85 complied with the Ninth Circuit's order in Levine to
77. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1446. See Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (public has presumptive right of access to criminal trials); KPNX
Broadcasting, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d. 431 (1984) (order prohibiting media sketches of crimi-
nal proceeding violated the media's constitutional right of access).
78. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1446.
79. Id. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (the press cannot
obtain copies of the White House tapes-to which the public has never had access); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1975) (government does not have an affirmative duty to allow
face-to-face interviews with prison inmates-a source of information not available to the pub-
lic generally). See generally Comment, News-Source Privilege in Libel Cases: A Critical Analy-
sis, 57 WASH. L. REv. 349, 354-57, 360-62 (1982).
80. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1447.
81. Id.
82. Id. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
83. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1447. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 830 (The
Court noted that the regulation prohibiting the media from interviewing prison inmates was
not intended to conceal prison conditions).
84. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1448. See supra notes 45-49 and accom-
panying text.




"fashion an order specifying the proscribed types of statements" based on
the determination of which types of extrajudicial statements threatened
the empaneling of an impartial jury.8 6 She stated that the district court
should have set forth a brief rationale for each of the categories the court
adopted, since a constitutionally sensitive area of prior restraint and First
Amendment surrounded the gag order.87
B. History and Analysis of the Media's First Amendment Right of
Access/Right to Gather Information
Courts have long recognized the media's right of access to the court-
room. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,8 8 the United States Supreme
Court first acknowledged the media's right of access or right to gather
information under the First Amendment. In Richmond Newspapers, the
trial judge closed a criminal proceeding to the public. 89 The Supreme
Court reversed this judgment because the trial court failed to consider
alternative solutions to avoid prejudicial publicity, such as sequestration
of jurors.90 The Court also stated that media presence at criminal trials
enhanced the integrity of the judicial system.9 However, the Court lim-
ited the right of access to sitting, watching, listening, and reporting on
criminal trials.92 Such a limitation grants the media access to the same
information that a private individual could obtain.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications,93 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that "[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no right
to information about a trial superior to that of the general public."94 In
Pell v. Procunier,95 the Court concluded that a regulation restricting in-
terviews with specific prison inmates did not deny press access to infor-
mation available to the general public.9 6 In addition, the Court in
Branzburg v. Hayes97 stated that the "first amendment does not grant the
press a consitutional right of special access to information not available
86. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1448 (quoting Levine, 764 F.2d at 599).
87. Id. at 1448.
88. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
89. Id. at 561.
90. Id. at 580-81.
91. Id. at 569-73.
92. Id. at 576. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
93. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
94. Id. at 609.
95. 417 U.S. 817 (1975).
96. Pell, 416 U.S. at 835. See Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (Court
reached the same conclusion with respect to federal prison inmates).
97. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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to the public generally."9
However, in recognizing the media's right of access to the court-
room, courts have repeatedly invalidated prior restraints on the media's
reporting of a criminal proceeding. 9 Moreover, courts have invalidated
orders restraining media access to criminal proceedings. "
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart.1" 1 In Nebraska Press Association, police discovered
six members of a family murdered, and subsequently arrested Charles
Simants. Extensive press coverage surrounded the case, and the trial
judge issued a restraining order prohibiting the media from broadcasting
or publishing accounts of defendant's confession made to the police.
10 2
The United States Supreme Court held that the order violated the free-
dom of the press."13 The Court reviewed the order under a strict scru-
tiny standard, and created a three-part test. All three prongs of this test
must be met before a trial judge can issue a restraining order. The judge
must find that:
1. The extent of publicity would prejudice the accused's
fair trial right;
2. Traditional devices such as a change of venue, contin-
uance, voir dire, would not ensure a fair trial; and
3. The prior restraint of publication would be effective
and accomplish its purpose. °4
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court couched the first prong
of this test in Learned Hand's clear and present danger terms. 10 5 The
clear and present danger standard had never before applied to prior
restaints. 106 This standard of review differs from the Sheppard case and
its reasonable likelihood standard which was used in the context of re-
98. Id. at 684. See also Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145 (acknowledged media's consti-
tutional right of access).
99. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 729 F.2d 1174; Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539.
100. See Associated Press, 705 F.2d 1143; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
101. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See also Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of
Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431 (1977), describing Nebraska Press
Ass'n as the "most important decision on the variety of problems that go under the name of
fair trial/fair press controversy." Schmidt, supra at 431.
102. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 542.
103. Id. at 570.
104. Id. at 563.
105. Note, Rights in Collision: Deciding Cases in the Free Press/Fair Trial Debate, 49 CIN-
CINNATI L. REV. 440, 451 (1980). "[T]he gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Nebraska Press
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
106. Note, Rights in Collision: Deciding Cases in the Fair Press/Fair Trial Debate, supra
note 105 at 452.
[Vol. 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
straints on trial participants; the Nebraska Press Association clear and
present danger test should not apply when the trial court issues an order
restraining the trial participants from certain conduct. 10 7 This test be-
comes applicable only when a prior restraint exists on the press' right to
speak or publish.'0 8 Case law supports this interpretation of Nebraska
Press Association. For example, in Central South Carolina Chapter of
Professional Journalists v. Martin,109 the district court interpreted Ne-
braska Press Association to hold that
proscriptions on trial participants' prejudicial statements in a
criminal trial are not to be considered as prior restraints on
non-trial participants' First Amendment rights to publish and
comment upon judicial proceedings and that proscriptions on
trial participants' are to be judged by the Sheppard reasonable-
ness standard as it regulates the conduct of the participants in
the trial. 0
The Levine court incorrectly used the Nebraska Press Association
test in evaluating gag orders on trial participants."' Some other courts
have used a "serious and imminent threat""' 2 standard, but in determin-
ing the necessity of a gag order on trial participants, no clear agreement
exists as to which standard applies. 1 3 Some courts have applied a "rea-
sonable likelihood of interference""' test, which is more consistent with
Sheppard.
With the application of varying standards, the courts appear to fail
to recognize the basic difference between gag orders against trial partici-
pants and those against the media. Orders restricting media access to the
107. Central South Carolina Chapter, 431 F. Supp. at 1188.
108. Id.
109. 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D.S.C. 1977).
110. Central South Carolina Chapter, 431 F. Supp. at 1188.
111. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
112. See United States v. Marcano Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1354, 1357-58 (D.P.R. 1978).
Other tests have been set forth. Central South Carolina Chapter, 431 F. Supp. at 1188-89 (the
court applied a "substantial likelihood standard"); State v. Schmid, 109 Ariz. 349, 509 P.2d
619 (1973) ("likely to interfere standard"); Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d
797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969) ("high probability of interfer-
ence" with fair trial); State ex rel. Miami Herald v. McIntosh, 340 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1977) (at
the court's discretion for good cause).
113. Note, Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal Jury Cases, 45 UTAH L. REV. 45, 46
n.4 (1984).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 673, 679 (D. Md. 1975); United States
v. Anderson, 356 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (D.N.J. 1973); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App.
3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1973); People v. Watson, 15 Cal. App. 3d. 28, 92 Cal. Rptr.
860, 868-69 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971); State v. Carter, 141 N.J. Super. 405, 363
A.2d 366, 369 (1976); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 780, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1976).
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courtroom interfere directly with the freedom of the press, a right guar-
anteed by the Constitution.1 5 Journalists are prevented from dissemi-
nating information to the public, and the public is deprived of particular
news.116 By contrast, a gag order against people involved in a govern-
ment proceedings cannot pass First Amendment muster, unless a com-
pelling reason exists in abridging the right to speak. 1 7 These gag orders
affect different groups, yet courts merge these orders together.
C. Radio and TV's Evaluation of Miller's Gag Order
The court in Radio and TV upheld the amended gag order based on
"whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable and whether the inter-
ests [of the government] override the very limited incidental effects of
the [order] on First Amendment rights.""' Also, the restrictions im-
posed must serve a legitimate purpose.1 9 The court evaluated the Radio
and TV restraining order against a rational basis criterion different from
either the reasonable likelihood or clear and present danger standard of
review. It also determined that since an infringement on the trial partici-
pants did not occur in Levine, '2 0 the Radio and TV court appeared to
apply a lesser standard than the Nebraska Press Association or Sheppard
test.
On closer reflection, the amended gag order does not even seem to
meet the more lenient, rational basis standard established by the Radio
and TV court for the analysis of the media's right. The order on its face
appears reasonable, because the possibility of prejudice and bias does ex-
ist. But the chance of prejudicial publicity always pervades a case, espe-
cially a criminal trial with distinctive fact situations. If courts applied
the standard of Radio and TV in similiar situations, then courts would be
bound to uphold every restraining order, simply because a chance of prej-
udicial publicity exists. The Radio and TV court should have also fo-
cused on the actual impact of pretrial publicity on the Miller case, as
opposed to centering on the chances of prejudicial publicity on the Miller
case. As noted in Judge Nelson's dissenting opinion in Levine, the im-
pact of publicity should have been the court's focus. 1 2 ' In Radio and TV,
the press had already published an account of the Miller trial; therefore,
the court should have analyzed this situation based on the potential im-
115. Sack, supra note 27 at 427-28.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Radio and Television News Ass'n, 781 F.2d at 1447.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Levine, 764 F.2d at 603.
[Vol. 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
pact the newspaper account had on the case. If the court considered the
impact of pretrial publicity and weighed it against the reasonableness of
the order, the decision in Radio and TV would have been different. The
court would have had to examine the impact of pretrial publicity in prej-
udicing an entire community of potential Miller jurors. As noted in
Judge Nelson's dissenting opinion in Levine, widespread prejudice in a
large metropolitan area appears remote.122 With a population of twelve
million people in the Central District of California 123 alone, the chance
of finding twelve jurors who have not read the newspaper article in ques-
tion seems high. According to Judge Nelson in Levine, media coverage
would still pervade the Miller trial, even with a gag order restricting trial
participants' comments. 124 She further cautioned that "the court should
consider seriously whether the benefits to the First Amendment will out-
weigh the costs to the Sixth Amendment before resorting to a prior re-
straint on speech." 125 As a result, the impact of prejudicial publicity is
low, and consequently, fails this prong of the test.
Radio and TV's second prong of its test was whether the govern-
ment's interest overrides the effect of the order on First Amendment
rights. The government does have an interest in assuring a fair trial for
Miller. However, the gag order substantially affects the First Amend-
ment rights of the attorneys involved in this proceeding. As noted in
Judge Nelson's dissenting opinion, this gag order in effect denies a person
the opportunity to defend himself publicly through a spokesperson.
126
An analogy best illustrates this "chilling" effect of a gag order: "if an
accused wants to charge that the indictment against him was politically
motivated, the freedom to make such a charge against the state is surely
protected by the First Amendment." '127 Thus, to deprive a defendant of
a chance to criticize the government through his attorney severely re-
stricts his First Amendment rights.'2 Thus, the government's interest in
a fair trial does not outweigh the defendant's First Amendment's right.
The third requirement set forth in Radio and TV concerned whether
or not the order served a legitimate purpose. This requirement does not
seem to pose a problem. Based on both the Levine and Radio and TV
opinions and records, no illegitimate purposes existed. Neither the dis-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 604.
125. Id.




LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
trict court nor the Ninth Circuit appear to hide the Miller proceedings
from the public.
However, even though the gag order met the third requirement, ar-
guably the first and second prongs were not met. As a result, the court
should not have upheld the order in Radio and TV. Since the prejudicial
impact of pretrial publicity was remote, the jury pool of the Central Dis-
trict virtually assured the trial judge that twelve unbiased jurors existed.
Moreover, the infringement of the defendant's First Amendment right to
speak against the government clearly outweighed the government's inter-
est in conducting a proceeding without the defense attorney's comments
on the case. Such additional factors further demonstrate that the gag
order should not have been upheld.
III. CONCLUSION
Courts have used different standards in determining the legitimacy
of gag orders on trial participants or the media. In Levine, the district
court scrutinized the gag order against trial participants under the Ne-
braska Press Association clear and present danger standard. Instead, the
order should have been measured against the Sheppard reasonableness
standard. But even with an analysis under Sheppard, the result may be
the same: a "reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial
will prevent a fair trial" '129 did exist. However, the court should have
also taken Judge Nelson's dissent into consideration; the court should
consider the possible impact of prejudicial news on potential jurors. If
either the district court or the Ninth Circuit in Levine weighed in this
factor, the gag order would not have been imposed.
In Radio and TV, the Ninth Circuit applied a test different from
that in Nebraska Press Association or Sheppard. But the court's analysis
failed to recognize that the amended gag order really did not satisfy two
of the three prongs of their own test. Morever, the fact that the prejudi-
cial impact on potential jurors was virtually nonexistent, and that there
was a possible impingement on the defendant's First Amendment rights
further stengthen the argument posed in the dissenting opinion of Levine
and Radio and TV. As stated in the dissenting opinion, the gag order
should not have been imposed on the trial participants of the Miller
proceeding. 
130
The Levine and Radio and TV cases leave the judiciary with a ques-
tionable precedent. Courts may now apply the Nebraska Press Associa-
129. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
130. Radio and Television News Ass'n 781 F.2d at 1448.
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tion test to gag orders against trial participants. The application of such
a strict standard will "chill" the speech of parties to a suit and their
counsel. But even under a Sheppard reasonableness analysis, some gag
orders on trial participants may still pass muster, and may also "chill"
the trial participants' speech. If courts factored the actual impact of pre-
trial publicity on possible jurors into its analysis, then not all gag orders
would be upheld. The media's coverage of a criminal proceeding does
not always bias the population.
The judiciary has the duty and authority to ensure that defendants
receive a fair trial. Courts need to maintain the impartiality of the pro-
ceedings. Gag orders are one way of controlling the courtroom. How-
ever, the implication of gag orders can lead to First Amendment
concerns of both the trial participants and the media. Courts need to
look at the long-range consequences of a gag order, and the actual impact
on a potential jury. If courts continue to validate prior restraints in
similiar situations, attorneys will be prevented from voicing comments
and criticism about the proceedings. The accused faces not only the vast
resources and prestige of the government, but the media's power to dis-
seminate information about the trial. As a result, attorneys need to speak
out to lessen the damage to their client's current and future image.' 3 ' As
noted by Judge Norris' dissent in Levine II, "the imperative duty of an




131. Levine II, 775 F.2d at 1055.
132. Id. (citing A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 455 (1833)).
This was a statement made by President Buchanan at the impeachment trial of a judge who
jailed an attorney because he criticized that judge. Id.
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